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Abstract
The dramatic reduction in the growth rate of bank lending associated
with the 1990-91 recession, particularly in New England, has evoked claims by
many observers of a credit crunch. However, because of the difficulty in
determining whether the observed slow credit growth is a demand or supply
phenomenon, convincing evidence of the practical importance of credit crunches
for economic activity remains elusive. We overcome this obstacle by examining
a cross-section of banks in New England that have experienced the same
economic downturn, effectively controlling for changes in demand. We find
empirical support for a capital crunch, whereby poorly capitalized
institutions shrink to satisfy capital requirements. This alone is not a
sufficient condition for a credit crunch. However, we find s6me additional
evidence that the ca~~ital crunch may have limited credit availability in New
England.                                            ~.:
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positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston or the Federal Reserve System.asymmetric information and the lemons problem (for example, Myers-Majluf
1984). Because managers have no incentive to disclose problems in their asset
portfolio, potential equity holders, concerned that only probTem banks would
be willing to dilutethe shares of current equity owners, refuse to buy new
stock issues at a price providing "normal" economic returns. Thus, new equity
cannot be issued at a price that management and current shareholders deem
reasonable, leaving shrinkage as the only feasible alternative for troubled
banks to satis~fy binding~capital requirements. In fact, in our sample of New
England banks many have chosen to shrink.
For problems in the banking sector to extend to the real economy, banks
must provide a service that is not easily provided by alternative financial
intermediaries. While alternatives to bank~financing are available for large
borrowers, most small and medium-sized businesses depend on banks for
financing. Banks specialize in this segment, where most information is
private rather than public; where the industry, management skills, and local
conditions may be critical to the determination of credit’Lworthiness; and
where lending institutions can achieve economies of scope in monitoring the
lender. Because of this asymmetry in’information, most small and medium-sized
businesses find banks the only economical source of debt financing (see, for
example, Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Elliehausen and Wolken 1990; and Kashyap,
Stein and Wilcox 1991).
The purpose of this paper is to document that the recent reduction in
bank capital has caused New England banks to shrink. Using a theoretical
model, we document how bank behavior can be altered by binding capital
regulations. Then, controlling for demand, we find empirical evidence
supporting the hypothesis that New England banks have experienced a capital
2crunch-. We also provide some suggestive evidence that bank shrinkage has, in
fact~ reduced bank lending. If a~’~mmetric information is importaqt and if the
costs of acquiring information and monitoring loans are large, then a capital
crunch may cause a decline in lendi~ng that is not filled by other lenders,
o~,~,~o, that ~.i.s, a credit crunch.
The first section of this paper summarizes recent banking condit~ions in
New England. It shows that banks experienced large reductions in capital
during a period when capital regulation became increasingly important. The
second section provides a theoretical model, which verifies that a loss of
bank capital resulting in binding capital requi~6~ents will cause a bank to
behave differently than it would if the requirements were not binding. The
model also documents that binding capital requirements can best be ascertained
by examining the liabilities of a bank rather than the assets. We therefore
focus on liabilities in our empirical section, in contrast to most previous
work which has focused on bank assets (for example, Bernanke and Lown 1991 and
King 1986). We control for loan demand by limiting our empirical analysis to
a cross-section of banks in a single region that face~/~ihe same economic
downturn.
Our study concludes that bank behavior in New England was altered by the
loss of capital. Poorly capitalized banks shrank both their liabilities and
assets more than their better capitalized competitors, with the deposit
reductions occurring in the marginal and most expensive accounts rather than
across the board, as might occur if the deposit shrinkage were initiated by
depositors. We also find evidence of a positive relationship between total
loan growth and the capital/asset ratio. Thus, controlling for any general
weakness in loan demand, we find substantial empirical support for a capitalcrunch in New England, and more limited support for the credit crunch
hypothesis.
I. Background
Our study focuses on New England because it was the first region to have
substantial losses of capital during a period when capital regulations were
actively enforced. The adoption of international capital requirements and the
attention given to the savings and loan debacle have made bankers, regulators,
and politicians acutely sensitive to capital regulation. If we cannot find
evidence of a capital crunch in New England during the recent economic
downturn, it is unlikely to be a problem elsewhere.
The loss of bank capital in New England had its roots in the previous
decade. After experiencing losses on Thi~rd World loans, oil industry loans,
and farm loans, many banks decided to focus on their local market. The rapid
rise in real estate prices, combined with the widely held perception that
nominal prices might flatten but were unlikely to fall,~caused New England
banks between 1984 and 1988 to expand real estate loans fourfold, almost twice
the rate of banks nationwide. ~hen nominal real estate prices began to fall
in New England, banks experienced a sharp increase in nonperforming assets,
which grew from approximately $3 billion at the end of 1987 to approximately
$17 billion by the end of 1990, of which 79 percent were real estate loans.
These nonperforming loans seriously eroded capital ratios.
Table I summarizes balance sheet statistics for banks in our sample. We
define as large any institutio~ with assets that exceed $300 million,
consistent with call report classifications. We also separate savings and
commercial banks, because savings banks have historically had fewer commercial
4Table 1
New England B~nk Balance Sheet Statistics
1990:1 - 1991:1
Change in assets ($ billions)
Change in equity ($ billions)
% Change in assets (91:1/90:1)
% Change in equity (91:1/90:1)
Capital/Assets 90:1
Capital/Assets 91:1
% Non-performing Assets 90:1
% Non-performing Assets 91"I
Number of banks















-10.1 -7.6 3.0 2.1
-5.9 -28.2 -10.5 -4.7
5.2 7.6 8.0 9.3
5.4 5.9 7.0 8.7
5.0 5.6 2.7 3.1
7.4 8.7 5.5 4.6
49 82 150 141
71 63 37 25and industrial loans, although no legal impediments remain to prevent them
from making such loans. (The sample is described more completely i’n the
empirical section of this paper.)
The largest reduction in assets occurred in the large commercial banks
category. From the first quarter of 1990, when the extent of the problems at
Bank of New England first became apparent, to the first quarter of 1991, l~rge
commercial bank equity fell by $500 million. At the same time, assets dropped
by $16 billion. The large drop in assets was likely due to the low capital
ratios maintained by large commercial banks before the collapse in real estate
prices, and to their inability to raise new capital in the depressed market.
In fact, the decline in assets was so large that the capital/asset ratio
actually increased over the period. Compared to large commercial banks, large
savings banks had nearly three times as large a reduction in equity, yet their
decrease in assets was less than one-third the size. This is likely related
to the higher initial capital ratios of the savings banks.
The smaller institutions had much smaller percentag6 declines in equity
and actually had asset growth during the period. Much higher initial capital
positions and smaller proportions of non-performing loans enabled the smaller
institutions to avoid many of the problems experienced by the larger banks.
A large number of New England banks shrank during this period. For
example, among large commercial banks and large savings banks in our sample,
71% and 63%, respectively, actually shrank. Even among the less affected
smaller i~stitutions, at least one-quarter of their number were downsizing.
While this shrinkage of institutions is consistent with a capital
crunch, it is also consistent with a slower economy. During economic
downturns it is not surprising that some banks shrink. And if large
6commercial and industrial loans are most severely affected by the downturn,
the larger banks would experience-~he most severe problems. While the number
of institutions shrinking is quite large, the economic downturn was severe in
New England and banks had already ~e~n experiencing a sectoral decline as
other~intermediaries infringed on their traditional lending markets. It is
the purpose of the theoretical and empirical sections of this paper to;
determine if, after controlling for demand factors, the capital crunch was an
important factor affecting bank behavior in New England.
II. A Simple Model of Banks
To establish why a capital crunch may have been important in New England
in 1990, we provide a highly simplified one-period model of the banking
firm.2 Each relationship has been linearized and written such that all
parameters are assumed to be positive. The bank is assumed to have only two
assets, bank reserves (R) and loans (L), and two liabilities, bank capital (K)
and deposits (D). Thus, for simplicity we are ignoring the myriad of issues
related to asset and liability management by banks.
The balance sheet constraint requires that total assets must equal total
liabilities. Furthermore, banks must hold reserves equal to their reserve
requirement ratio (e) times their outstanding deposits.3
2 We chose a one-period model to provide the simplest framework to
illustrate the importance of capital. (For a more complete description of how
capital requirements affect bank behavior see Osterberg (1990)). In a dynamic
model, one would need to model when equity was issued, dividend policy, and the
relation between current loans and future loan losses. While these additions
would provide a richer model, they would not alter our fundamental results.
3 In reality, banks must hold reserve requirements only on their
transactions accounts. The current reserve requirement is 3 percent on net
transactions accounts up to $41.1 million~ and 12 percent on net transactions
accounts above $41.1 million.. However, the first $3.4 million of reservable( 1 ) R +L =K+D
(2) R=~D
Banks can expand deposits by offering interest rates on deposits greater than
the mean deposit rate in their market (~-~), and loans decrease as the bank
offers a loan rate higher than the mean loan rate in their market (~).4
(3) D=fo+f~(r~--~-~)
(4) L=go--g~(rL--~S)
Finally, bank behavior may be further constrained by the required
capital/asset ratio (p).
(5) K = ~(R+L)
The bank is assumed to maximize profitS (~). Because our profit
function abstracts from fee income and overhead costs, total profits are
simply the difference between interest income on loans (rLL) net of loan
Iosses(~L) and interest paid on deposits (rDD).
(6) ~=(rs-~) L-r~D
Using (I)-(4) to eliminate R, L, rL and rD from (5) and (6), the maximization
problem can be stated as the followingLagrangian, with Lagrangian multiplier
A associated with the capital ratio constraint.
liabilities have a zero percent reserve requirement. It is assumed in the model
that bank~:do not hold excess reserves. This assumption is minor since most
banks avoid holding excess reserves.
4 This mode] ignores the uncertainty associated with shocks to deposit and
loan flows. Because we have only one asset other than reserves in this simple
model, we do not consider the many interesting issues involving portfolio
composition.
8(7) Max ~=
÷~ [_R[-~ (-;~+D) ]
When the capita] ratio is not bind~ing, A=0, and the profit function 9s
~. uncoD.strained.
Choosing D to maximize profits results in the two first-order
5 conditions:
and
(9) d~: _ (I-~) K-~D=0 dl
For vt~-~O, we can solve for D directly from (9):
(10) D= I---T-~- K
When A=O, the level of D can be obtained directly from (8):
-2 (i-~) fiK+ (l-s) fl ( go +gi~-g~~ ) + fogl- figi~--m (il) D=
2 (Z-(Z) ~fi+Zgi
Thus, when bank behavior is not constrained by binding capital requirements, a
reduction in capital increases deposits:
~ Of course, banks choose the level of deposits by choosing rD. However,
because we are interested in deposits rather than %, it is more direct to state
the optimization problem in.terms of choosing D.
9(12) dD= -(I-~) f~ <0 dK (i-~) 2fl+g1
And, using (I) and (2), it can be seen that loans would fall, but by less than
dollar for dollar:
(13) dL_     gl     >0 but <I
dn (I-~) 2f~.+gz
When faced with an adverse shock to their capital, banks could shrink loans
dollar for dollar. However, this would require them to forgo profitable
loans. Thus, banks increase deposits to replace at least some of their lost
capital. However, given (3), this entails an increased cost of deposits. At
the same time, the more loans shrink, the higher is the return to loans. The
slower the return to loans falls (larger is gl) and the faster the cost of
deposits rises (smaller is fl), the larger the decline in loans.
The bank reacts very differently to a loss of capital if the capital
ratio is binding (l~O). In this case, both deposits and loans decrease.
(14) dD_ (1-~) >0 dK ~
(15) dL_ (I-~+~) >0
dK    ~
The decline in K forces a proportional decline in D. The binding capital
ratio prevents deposits being substituted for the lost capital, as in the
previous ~~xample. With both K and D d~clining and the decline in R being less
than that in D, loans must decliie. Note that only the capital requirement
matters for the bank deposits reaction in the constrained case, while the.
reserve requirement and the interest sensitivities of both deposits and loans
I0(and not the capital constraint) affect the deposits reaction in the
unconstrained case. The determin~ts of the change in loans differ similarly,
being solely a function of the capital requirement and the reserve requirement
in the constrained case.
o~_,.,With both D and K declining inthe capital constrained case, total
liabilities, and hence total assets, unequivocally decline.
(16) d(K+D) _ d(R+L) _ 1 >i
dK     dK ~
However, in the unconstrained case total assets and liabilities
may rise or fall: ...... ~
(17) d(K+D) d(R+L) _ -or (l-a) fi+gi <I
dI<      dK     (l-a) 2fi+gl
Whether the bank shrinks or grows when K declines depends on the relative
magnitudes of e, gl, and fl, with growth more likely the larger is gl and the
smaller are f~ and e (given the likely range of values for e)!i~.~Equations
(16) and (17) show that a decline in bank capital wil!~Fause banks facing
binding capital constraints to shrink by more than tho~i institutions not sor
constrained. That is, when a negative capital shock Occurs, the degree of
shrinkage is a function of the bank’s capital/asset ratio.
This simple model illustrates why~ the capital crunch may be a recent
phenomenon. A large negative shock to capital is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for a capital crunch. Banks definitely shrink only if
the capital requirements are binding. If capital remains well above the
minimum required, or if regulatory authorities do not enforce capital
a The conditions required for (17).to be negative are the same as those
that make dD/dK < -1 in (12).
11requirements, the bank will shrink by less and may even grow. Therefore, the
experience in New England may be different from previous episodes, when the
regulatory authorities did not strictly enforce capital regulations. For
example, when Third World loans began to default in the early 1980s,
regulatory authorities practiced forbearance. And, during the savings and
loan debacle, regulators not only practiced forbearance but also allowed
accounting gimmicks to prop up capital.
A second reason capital requirements have recently affected bank
behavior is the adoption of international risk-based capital standards as a
result of the December 1987 Basel Accord. In addition, regulators have
supplemented the risk-based capital standard with a minimum leverage ratio.
The adoption of new capital ratios, accompanied by a realization of the huge
costs resulting from the earlier lax regulation ofthe savings and loan
industry, has placed pressure on Congress and regulators to rigorously enforce
banking regulations.
The model has several important implications for th~ empirical analysis.
First, it shows that negative capital shocks will cause banks to shrink if the
capital ratio becomes binding. Second’, it suggests that deposits rather than
loans may be the more appropriate indicator for capital crunch tests because
an adverse shock to capital causes loans to decline whether or not the capital
constraint is binding, while deposits decline with an adverse capital shock
only if capital is constrained. Finally, the size of the capital lost on real
estate loans in New England banks, combined with the recent rigorous
enforcement of capital regulations, makes likely the conditions for a capital
crunch described in the model, namely large capital losses and binding capital
regulations.
12III. Empirical Evidence of a Capital Crunch
Empirical investigations of~redit crunches have been hampeKed by~the
difficulty in separating the decrease in the demand for loans that normally
occurs in a recession from the dimfnfshed supply of loans. We avoid this
...... ~..problem by focusing on a cross-section of banks that were all subject to the
same regional economic downturn. If decreases in assets and liabilities of
banks during recessions were solely due to decreased demand, all banks should
shrink by similar proportions.7 If, however, the capital crunch hypothesis
is correct, shrinkage of liabilities and assets, should be greater, the lower
the capital/asset ratio of the bank.          ~~ ’~’~
The Data
We examine a sample of commercial banks and savings banks in New England
from the first quarter of 1990 to the first quarter of 1991. The first
quarter of 1990 was chosen as the starting date for several reasons. First,
the most recent data available were from the first quarter of 1991 and the
change in assets and ~liabilities must be calculated over multiples of four
quarters to avoid distortions due to seasonal factors.~~ii~econd, choosing a
relatively short window limits the distortions that occur with bank mergers
and failures. Finally, in the first quarter of 1990 bank examiners found
substantial problems in the Bank of New England’s real estate portfolio. This
caused other banks (and examiners) to reexamine their own institutions.
7 Of course, banks being subject to the same economic downturn is not
equivalent to being subject to identical demand shocks. However, by limiting our
sample to a single Federal Reserve district rather than the nation, the range of
the demand shocks is much more limited. In our estimated equations, we attempt
to allow for differences in demand shocks~ across banks in our sample due to
different ty-pes of banking activities.
13Because the balance sheet data collected by the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) are not consistent with those collected by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), savings and loans are not included in
our sample. Fortunately for this study, savings and loans play a much smaller
role in New England than they do elsewhere in the country.8
Several types of institutions were dropped because their capital or
liabilities radically differed from most banks in the sample.9 Banks that
opened after January I, 1989, were dropped from the sample because new banks
start with I00 percent capital and then, as they begin to make loans, expand
much more rapidly than mature banks. Inclusion of these banks would have made
the link between capital and expansion appear .much stronger than was
appropriate for institutions not newly formed. In addition, institutions with
either no loan losses or no nonperforming loans were dropped for essentially
the same reason: they were recently formed banks just beginning to make
loans. Institutions with no commercial and industrial loans or no demand
deposits, such as cooperative banks and nonbank banks, also were dropped.
Generally, this latter type of institution has large securities operations but
is not actively involved in loan origination, which is the focus of the
problems with credit availability.
Failed, institutions also presented a problem. Liquidated institutions
were eliminated from the sample because their end-of-period balance sheet is
zero. Inclusion would have biased the results toward finding a relationship
8 O~STsupervised institutions comprise only 6.6 percent of the total assets
of New England depository institutions.
9 In addition to those deletions mentioned in the text, we eliminated one
small commercial bank that consistently maintained a capital/asset ratio in
excess of 25 percent, over three times the mean capital!asset ratio of the
sample.             .~
14between capital and bank shrinkage that represented insolvency rather than
changes in bank behavior. Failed~institutions acquired by OTS-supervised
institutions were dropped because comparable end-of-period data were not
available. Banks that merged with~failed OTS-supervised institutions also
were dropped because beginning-of-period data on the acquired institutions
were not available.
All other institutions, a sample of mature commercial banks and savings
banks, remained in the sample. Institutions that merged between January 1989
and the first quarter of 1991 were combined into a single institution for our
sample. That is, they were treated as if theo~.me:t~ger were consummated at the
beginning rather than in the middle of our sample period. Otherwise, merged
institutions would have to be dropped and acquiring institutions would
experience large increases in liabilities due to the acquisition. A separate
file of institutions not involved in acquisitions was maintained to ensure
that this assumption did not significantly affect our results.I°
Another potential problem is the definition of capital. Capital
regulation includes a variety of definitions, which u~i~different measures of
capital, different measures of assets, and different treatments of intangible
assets.11 Rather than attempt to test all the different definitions of
Io The full sample inCluded 420 banks: 49 large commercial banks, 149 small
commerci.al banks, 82 large savings banks, and 140 small savings banks. After
excluding those banks that merged with institutions outside of their holding
company during the 1989-1990 period, the sample size was reduced to 404 banks.
We obtained essentially the same empirical results with this "clean" sample.
11 ~he risk-based ratios are 8 percent for the ratio of total capital to
risk-weighted assets and 4 percent for tier I capital to risk-weighted assets.
The leverage ratio is 3 percent of tier i capital to total assets for banks with
a CAMEL rating of i~ All other banks are expected to maintain capital 100 to 200
basis points above the minimum° Core capital consists of common equity,
qualifying preferred stock, and minority~interest in consolidated subsidiaries
less goodwill, l-n practice~ core capital is frequently calculated net of all
15capital, we have used total equity capital divided by total assets. This
definition most closely conforms to the leverage ratio~ the capital standard
that is generally the most binding on banks.12
Banks have some latitude in classifying and reserving for loan losses
(Walter 1991). Consequently, we also calculate a measure of capital that
controls for differences in banks’ willingness to reserve on their
nonperforming loans. Some banks, with very large nonperforming loan
portfolios and very small loan loss reserves, have overstated their current
capital because they have yet to realize (in an accounting sense) the
deterioration in their loan portfolio. Equation (18) provides an adjusted
capital ratio to account for differences across banks in reserving for
nonperforming assets. This attempts to put all banks in our sample on an





NP~ = non~grforming loans for bank i
intangible assets.
12 As of June 30, 1991, Of the 20 largest First District commercial and
savings banks, none violated tier I risk-based guidelines, seven violated total
risk-based guidelines, and nine violated a 5 percent leverage ratio.
16LLR~ :~loan loss reserves for bank i
If nonperforming loans relative to loan loss reserves for bank i ~re large
relative to those of comparable banks, bank i’s capital is decreased to adjust
for this difference.13 Similarly, banks that have lower than aver:~ge
nonpe~forming loans relative to loan loss reserves have adjusted c~pital that
exceeds reported capital. To maintain~a consistent balance sheet account, the
same capital adjustment was also added to total assets. All our results are
reported with and without the capital adjustment.
The Empirical Test
The capital crunch hypothesis predicts that poorly capitalized
institutions will shrink deposits more rapidly than better capitalized
institutions, holding the loan demand effects of the regional economy
constant. We test this by estimating the following equation.
ni + a2Ai + a3i~EEi + aa Ci i + asl~Ei +Ei (19) DEPi=ao +aI Tii
The dependent variable is the percentage change in tot~ deposits (DEP) from
the first quarter of 1990 to the first quarter of 1991.14 The beginning-of-
period capital to asset ratio (K/A) is calculated using first quarter 1990
data for total equity and assets.
13 For purposes of calculating adjusted capital, we divided our sample into
four categories of banks: large commercial, small commercial, large savings~ and
small savings. An average loan loss provision was then calculated for each set
of comparable institutions and used to adjust the capital of each bank in that
category. For the first quarter of 1990, the average ratios of nonperforming
loans to loan loss reserves were: large commercial banks, 1.53; small commercial
banks, 2.28; large savings banks, 2.71; small savings banks, 3.94.
14 This measure is calculated as a bank’s total liabil~ties excluding its
total equity, which is composed primarily but not exclusively of deposits.
17By limiting our sample to New England banks, we control for many of the
differences in loan demand faced by banks generally. However, it is possible
that banks specializing in particular types of loans may experience different
demand shocks. We try to control for possible differences in demand factors
faced by banks by including several variables that might capture differences
in lending opportunities. The first is the logarithm of asset size (A).
Banks are constrained not to lend more than 10 percent of their capital to any
one borrower. This constraint would prevent many smaller institutions from
making large loans. If the demand conditions vary by size of borrower, we may
see very different deposit growth rates by size of institution.
Another factor that may distinguish among banks is that those with large
off-balance-sheet activities may be better iDsulated from changes in demand
than banks that focus on lending. To control for this possibility, we include
the ratio of fee income to the sum of total interest and fee income (FEE) for
calendar year 1989. Demand shocks may also affect different types of lending
activity unevenly. We include the ratio of commercial and industrial loans to
total assets (CI) and the ratio of real estate loans to total assets (RE) held
in a bank’s portfolio in 1989 in order to control for banks with a large
exposure to a sector that might be disp.roportionately affected by an economic
downturn.
We further segment our sample in order to try to verify that we have
controlled for possible differences across banks in the degree to which they
are affected by demand shocks. Because New England savings banks have
generally been less active in lending to businesses, we categorize
institutions by whether they have a commercial or savings bank charter. This
provides a further check on whether Cl captures differences in demand shocks
18across~i, nstitutions. We further split the sample into large bank and small
bank categories. Large is defined~as any institution with at least $300
million in assets, consistent with the classification used in call reports.
Tables 2 and 3 report the results of estimating equation (19) for all
banks.~and for the four subcategories: large commercial banks, large savings
banks, small commercial banks, and small savings banks. Table 2 uses
unadjusted capital and Table 3 uses adjusted capital. We allow for the
possibility of heteroskedasticity in the error term using a White correction
(White 1980).
The results provide substantial support.~fo~’~he capital crunch
hypothesis. Capital ratios are a statistically significant determinant of
deposit growth in each of the regressions, with the estimated capital ratio
coefficient significant at the I percent confidence level in the large savings
banks and the all-banks samples. Furthermore, the magnitudes of the estimated
capital ratio coefficients are of roughly the same magnitude for the
corresponding regressions in Tables 2 and 3, with the most pronounced
difference occurring in the large commercial bank regf~i~ions. A 1 percentage
point decrease in a bank’s capital/asset ratio corresponds to a more than I
percent decline in its deposit growth rate for the all-banks sample and an
even more dramatic I and one-half percent drop for the large commercial banks
sample. Our results are not sensitive to the adjustment to capital for
differences across banks in reserving for nonperforming loans.
Asset size has a negative estimated coefficient in each regression, with
eight of the 10 coefficients being Statistically significant, seven at the I%
confidence level. Only in the small commercial bank sample is the effect
insignificant. Fee income has a positive sign in eight of the 10 regressions,
19Table 2
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.55~* 1.].5" --.04"* .43 .03 -.].9*
(.14) (.50) (.01) (.57) (.1.2) (.08)
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149      .03 .119
82 .49     .056
140     .17 .083
420     .24 .093
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*Significant at 5% confidence level
**Significant at 1% confidence levelTable 3
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(.01) (.56) (.12) (.08)
All Banks .35** 1.04-* -.03** .i0 ~ -.02 -.06












ITotal bank deposits are~defined hel        total bank liabilities less bank capital.
2Estimated with a White correction for heteroskedasticity, standard errors in parentheses.
*Significant at a 5% confidence level
**Significant at a 1% confidence levelalthough none are statistically significant. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that banks relying-heaviTy on fee income were more insulated from
the recent demand shocks. Banks with substantial commercial and industrial
loans and real estate loans do not appear to have experienced significantly
different demand shocks, with real estate loans having a statistically
significant effect only in the small savings bank sample. However, in eight
out of 10 cases estimated coefficients have a negative sign, suggesting that
institutions with large holdings of commercial and industrial loans and real
estate loans were subjected to stronger demand shocks during this period.
Tables 2~and 3 support the capital crunch hypothesis: institutions with
lower capital ratios grew more slowly (shrank more rapidly) to try to satisfy
capital requirements. Furthermore, the results are fairly consistent across
types and sizes of banks.I~ The next section examines how the decrease was
distributed across categories of deposits.
Composition Of Deposit Growth
If difficulty in meeting capital requirements, rather than weak demand,
accounts for the shrinkage of poorly capitalized institutions, the shrinkage
should not be uniform across deposit cetegories. Presumably, banks will
choose to shrink those accounts that are most expensive, while trying to leave
unchanged deposits that provide low-cost funds. We examine three categories
of deposits: NOW accounts, MMDA accounts, and large certificates of deposit
(CDs). The average interest rates paid nationally in 1990 for these accounts
were 4.58%, 6.29%, and 7.99%, respectively (Brunner, Duca, and McLaughlin
I~ F-tests cannot reject combining large with small commercial banks, large
with small savings banks, or small commercial banks with small savings banks.
However, the data do reject at the 5% significance level the combination of large
commercial banks with large savings banks, as well as the combination of all four
subcategories into the all-banks aggregate.
221991) While differences in the cost of maintaining and reserving these
accounts may be responsible for some of these differences, their cost ranking
is unlikely to be changed by including all the other costs associated with
these accounts. Because CDs tend ~o~be the marginal source of funds, we
antic~i.pate an even stronger response to capital/asset ratios in th.~.~~CD
equation relative to those in the NOW and MMDA equations.
We have re-estimated equation (19) with growth rates by deposit category
replacing the growth rate of total deposits. The results indicating the
sensitivity of deposit growth to a bank’s capital position are reported in
Table 4. The capital crunch hypothesis would~im~Yy that the capital/asset
ratio would have a larger positive sign the more costly the deposit account
and the more the deposit type serves as the marginal source of funds. For
ease of presentation, we have omitted from the table the estimated
coefficients of the variables included in the regressions that control for
bank characteristics.
The results in ~Table 4 support the hypothesis that banks have been
reducing the most costly accounts. For the all-banks’~i~egory, large CDs have
an estimated coefficient twice the size of either of the less costly accounts
and the coefficient is significant at the I percent confidence level. While
capital ratios have a statistically significant effect on MMDA growth in the
all-banks sample, their effect is not significant for NOW accounts.
Furthermore, although MMDA and NOW accounts have similar sized responses, the
MMDA response is measured with much greater precision.
Based on the adjusted capital measure, the point estimate of the
sensitivity of large CD growth to the capital ratio is greater than that for
MMDA accounts in all but the small commercial bank category. In three of theTable 4








Unadjusted Capital                             Adjusted Capital
NOW          MMDA      LarqeC~          _Hoj_q          MMDA      Lar~eCD_
4.14-* 4.6~i 7.77* 3.02** 4.26* 7.43*
1.06) (2.41) (3.62) (.98) (1.85) (3.11)
6.49 3.91-* 3.16-* 6.05 4.26** 3.89**
(4.83) (1.34) (1.14) (4.47) (1.28) (1.13)
1.02 1.85"* 2.95** ,95 1.82" 2.84**
o! ~90) (.67) (.75) (.84) (.71) (.72)
-1.98 .03 5.03 -1.61 -.05 5.01
(2.87) (1.02) (3.27) (2.59) (1.02) (3.44)
2.10 1.87"* 4.35** 2.].5 2.00** 4.40**
(2. 1.9) (. 56) (]_.20) (2.08) (. 54) (1. 1.7)
~The equations have been estimated with a White correction for heteroskedasticity and
include the same set of explanatory variables as those in Tables 2 and 3. Standard errors in p~rentheses.
*significant at 5% confidence level
**Significant at 1% confidence levelfour bank subcategories (small savings banks being the exception), the
capital/asset ratio has a significant effect on MMDA growth. On the other
hand, for the NOW account equations, only that for large commercial banks
shows a significant response. Thu~ the general pattern, whereby the more
...... ~.costl~ the account, the slower it grows when institutions become poorly
capitalized, is confirmed. Our hypothesis that CDs may be distinguishable as
the marginal source of funds for many institutions is also confirmed. In
fact, a I percentage point decline in the capital/asset ratio implies a more
than 4 percent decline in the growth rate .of l~rge CDs for the all-banks
sample and a more than 7 percent decline in th.e’~rge commercial banks sample.
Loans
The effects of capital constraints can be isolated better by examining
deposits rather than loans. The data suggest a statistically significant
positive relationship between a bank’s capital/asset ratio and its deposit
growth rate. To determine whether this capital crunch has resulted in a
credit crunch, we mu~t extend the analysis to assets.
Banks have several options available to reduce ~iir assets. One
possibility is selling securities, leaving their loan portfolio unchanged. If
so, assets would shrink, but the size of their loan portfolio would be
unaffected. Alternatively, they could shrink their loan~portfolio either by
selling or securitizing loans, by calling loans, or by tightening credit
standards. Loan sales should be preferred by banks because they do not
disrupt historical lending relationships. It has also become relatively easy
to sell certain categories of loans. For example, an active secondary market
exists for residential mortgages that conform to secondary market standards.
It has also become common to sell consumer loans. These loan sales can reduce
25the stock of loans in a bank’s portfolio without affecting its flow of new
lending. In that case, credit availability for new loans would be unaffected,
despite a large decline in loans reported on a bank’s balance sheet.
If banks choose to shrink by tightening credit standards and calling
loans, borrowers will be affected only if alternative sources of credit are
not available. Large firms with access to national credit markets will be
insulated from many disruptions in bank lending. Similarly, firms in the
middle market may have alternative sources of funds, such as foreign banks or
banks "inside or outside the region that are not capital constrained. In
addition, insurance companies, venture capital firms, and finance companies
have expanded operations to lend in markets traditionally serviced by banks.
Therefore, even if banks in one region reduce their lending, credit
availability becomes a problem onTy for those firms that must rely on local
banks for their credit, either because they are too small to go outside the
region or because banks outside the region and non-traditional lenders are not
available.
Unfortunately, the data required to adequately address this question are
not available. Loan sales are not reported in such a way that they can be
attributed to loan categories. Furthermore, data are not broken down by size
of firm, nor are data available on loans to firms in the region by insurance
companies, finance companies, and pension funds. Using currently available
sources, the link between a capital crunch and a credit crunch cannot be
tested definitively.
Because of these serious empirical problems, we try only to identify
whether the loan portfolio has shrunk as a result of the capital crunch. .This
can verify that the shrinkage is not entirely conducted with .sales of
26securities. However, it cannot determine whether new credit is less available
than before.
Table 5 provides evidence concerning the effect of capital!asset ratios
on total loan growth. A positive ~O~fficient indicates that the lower a
bank’~ capital/asset ratio, the slower its loan growth. If only securities
were sold, no relationship between loan growth and bank capitalization should
be present, even if banks were shrinking as a result of low capital/asset
ratios. For the all-banks sample, the coefficient is positive and significant
at the I% confidence level. The estimated coefficients for commercial banks
are larger and more significant than those for ~ings banks. Small savings
banks is the only category with an estimated coefficient that is not
statistically significant, though it is positive. The data thus support the
hypothesis that institutions with lower capital/asset ratios have lower loan
growth rates. This provides limited support for the hypothesis that the
capital crunch in New England may be having an influence on lending behavior,
though no definitive’effect on credit availability can be determined from such
tests.                                                               ~:~’
IV. Conclusion
This paper finds evidence of a capital crunch in New England.
Controlling for demand effects by using institutions experiencing the same
macroeconomic and regional economic shocks, as well as by including bank
characteristics that might be associated with different types of lending
activities, we found a strong positive relationship between a bank’s
capital/asset ratio and the growth rate of its deposits. If banks were
choosing to shrink, the shrinkage should be disproportionately in the more
27Table 5


















IThe equations have been estimated with a White correction for
heteroskedasticity and in~ude the same set of explanatory variables as those
in Tables 2 and 3. Standard errors in parentheses,
*Significant at 5% confidence level
**Significant at I% confidence level
28expensive (higher interest rate) accounts. We find that the growth rates of
large CD accounts have responded s~gnificantly to capital/asset ra~ios, while
core deposits generally showed a much smaller response.
Whether the capital crunch in~w England has resulted in a credit
crunch, is still unresolved~ Being a necessary condition, had we not found
support fora capital crunch we could have ruled out a credit crunch, at least
by this transmission mechanism. However, we do find strong support for a
capital crunch in New England. We also find evidence that bank shrinkage has
not been confined to securities, since more poorly capitalized institutions
have had relatively slower loan growth rates.~H~ver, we cannot know whether
new lending has declined or whether loan sales have increased. We also do not
know whether other lenders (e.g., banks outside the region, insurance
companies, or finance companies) have increased their lending activity
sufficiently to fill the void left by low-capital banks. This link between a
capital crunch and credit availability should be the subject of future
research.
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